Little of the formal structure of social authority was carried over into the New World. While the plan of East Jersey's Scottish proprietors called for a society based upon large estates farmed by tenants and servants, the East Jersey social order quickly deviated from the proprietary model. In part this was because of the large quantity of available land uninhabited by other Europeans; in part it was required by the process of colonization. To attract settlers to the New World, the proprietors promised all settlers the prospect of landownership after a term of years. When the terms of service of the first settlers expired, some acquired land, and the level of economic dependency in the society declined.
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While the formal structure of authority in the New World changed rapidly changes in the realm of social attitudes progressed much more slowly. Thus, while every settler was entitled to a free allotment of 30 acres of land, only about one-fourth of the adult male servants ever took up these lands (MS, "New Jersey Deeds," New Jersey State Library). Some of the others left the province, but many sold their rights to the land and remained in the colony, working on the estates or farms of other colonists. As in Scotland, the rate of geographic mobility was very high, as East Jersey Scots moved frequently from hamlet to hamlet. Scottish settlers never adopted an ideology of attachment to particular farms and particular pieces of land as did their English neighbors in the colony, and few farms remained for very long in one family line (MS, "New Jersey Wills," New Jersey State Library).
The influence of persisting Scottish social attitudes was augmented by the cultural environment of the New World. Scottish settlers to East Jersey arrived in a colony already inhabited by English settlers, and within this environment traditional hostilities quickly surfaced, resulting in a few instances of riots. Faced with such conflicts Scottish settlers from all regional backgrounds quickly formed unified ethnic settlements and isolated themselves from the larger English communities among which their settlements were interspersed.
The religious situation that developed in East Jersey demonstrates the importance that ethnic identity had acquired in the mixed cultural environment. Historically, Presbyterianism, the national church of Scotland, had been strongest wherever cultural conflict was the greatest: in the Border regions, for example, where hostilities between England and Scotland had become a part of regional folklore. In the Borders, the national church was dominant everywhere, and the rhetoric of Presbyterianism was anti-English in tone. In the Northeast, where conflict with the English was less frequent, Presbyterianism had never been strong, and Athens to investigate whether labor migration is related to acquisition of job skills and to changes in attitudes towards key elements of Greek culture. The sample consisted of 100 men and 100 women (no married pairs) who had been labor migrants in West Germany, as the study group, and 100 men and 100 women (no married pairs) who had never been out of Greece, as the controls. The respondents were selected randomly from a cluster sample of migrants and nonmigrants who had children in Athenian grade schools in 1976-77; this conveniently controlled age differences of respondents. The questionnaire was constructed after a year's work on lifehistory material (see Bernard and Voyoukalos 1976) .
Practically all the migrants had spent at least five years in West Germany. They had achieved permanent-resident status and their return to Greece may be considered voluntary. Two-thirds of the sample had come back to Greece more than five years prior to our study. Their responses may therefore be considered thoughtful and not the immediate result of "return shock."
The two groups differ greatly in education: nonmigrants are much better educated than migrants. Limited education and lack of economic opportunity are the reasons most often given for migration. Most of the migrants (80%) said that they had had no marketable skills when they left Greece, and even more (85%) reported that they had failed to acquire such skills in Germany. Of the 30 respondents who had acquired skills, 13 had been able to find employment utilizing them. During the 1960s, one of the major benefits of labor migration to industrialized zones of Europe was expected to be the formation of a returning cadre of skilled workers to help develop Greece. From our data, this appears not to have occurred. Migrants are more than twice as likely to be unskilled laborers as nonmigrants and nearly three times as likely to be skilled workers. Nonmigrants are seven times more likely than migrants to be white-collar employees or civil servants.
Another result of migration predicted during the 1960s was a change in values and attitudes among those who migrated. Depending on point of view, this was seen in the popular press of Greece as either a blessing ("modernization") or a curse ("loss of Greekness"). The data show that (a) nonmigrants are overwhelmingly more positive about Greece than migrants; (b) migrants are much more positive about migration than nonmigrants; (c) there is no significant difference between migrants and nonmigrants on 29 of the 32 items we used to test how modern or conservative people are; (d) men are much more positive than women about Greece; (e) women are more positive than men about migration; and (f) men are generally more modern on social issues than women.
While neither sex of respondent nor the experience of migration per se has any discernible effect on modernism, education clearly affects how people feel about socially important issues. Fully 23 of the 32 items in this domain are significantly distributed by level of education of the respondent.
There appears to be a kind of "middle-class conservatism" as measured by education. Those with a high-school education are most positive about Greece compared to West Germany, most negative towards migration, and most conservative in their attitudes towards divorce, dowry, and other sexrole issues. The lower and upper middle classes (as measured by primary schooling vs. postsecondary education-we couldn't get accurate information on income) seem to agree on many things. They seem to be more modem than those with a highschool education in their attitudes towards dowry, sex roles, child rearing, and divorce and more negative overall in their beliefs about how Greek social institutions (medical care, recreation, employment) measure up against those of an industrialized society like West Germany.
After we tested the standard demographic variables for their interaction with attitudinal data, we created a variable called "daughters." T-tests show that those with daughters only and those with both sons and daughters are significantly more in favor of abolishing the dowry than those with sons only. Further, if a respondent has any daughters and has been a migrant, he or she is likely to be in favor of abolishing the dowry. This is not nearly so likely among nonmigrants. On the issue of personal freedom, nonmigrants with daughters only are almost four times more negative than those with sons only; among migrants the ratio is two to one. Returned migrants with daughters only are the most inclined not to be pleased with Greece; 46% of persons in this category say they would migrate again if they had the chance vs. only 13% of the migrants with sons only. Among nonmigrants only 10% of those with sons only and 8% of those with daughters only would migrate.
Among the migrants, the issue of medical care looms very large. On the item "To what extent does the difference in medical care between Greece and West Germany create difficulties for you in your life?" 41% of nonmigrants with sons only and 37% with daughters only are negative, while 57% of migrants with sons only and 84% with daughters only are negative. On most of the items assessing the quality of life in Greece vs. West Germany, those with sons only are more positive than those with daughters. Returned migrants with daughters are the most negative of all.
We tested whether education, combined with the presence of daughters, was related to responses. Of respondents (migrants and nonmigrants) with only a primary education, 17% of those with sons only said they would migrate, or migrate again. Twice as many respondents with limited education and daughters said they would migrate, and the difference is very significant. The pattern is repeated for many variables.
From all this, we know that returned migrants and nonmigrants have very different attitudes on major social issues in Greece. A stepwist discriminant analysis on the two groups confirms this observation: only five variables in such an analysis are required to predict better than 70% of the time who is a returned migrant and who isn't.
We are left with a problem, however: we do not have any idea of cause and effect. Did migrants migrate in the first place because they were disenchanted with Greece, or did they get that way because of their experience abroad and their return? To approach this problem, we must ask why they came back when they did not have to. Answers to this question await the next phase of our research.
In the course of human evolution, directional changes are observed in the size of the permanent teeth. These changes are easily observable, since teeth are usually the best-preserved elements of fossil materials. Moreover, after eruption they undergo no developmental changes except wear and pathological processes which can be fully controlled for in the course of examination.
Morphological changes over time may have either a genetic or a nongenetic basis, and a number of factors may be responsible for their occurrence. One of these is natural selection. In order to demonstrate the operation of natural selection, one must observe traits being strongly determined genetically (as tooth size probably is) and demonstrate the differential fitness of individuals varying with respect to trait expression. Hence, one should show differential reproductive performance of individuals bearing variants of the trait. Skeletal materials pertaining to earlier human groups do not permit the observation of differential fertility, but it is relatively easy to observe mortality differences that can contribute to the operation of natural selection.
The aim of our study was to investigate mortality differences occurring in a medieval population with respect to the size of the posterior dentition (premolars and molars). Permanent molars begin to erupt around the sixth year of life, so we examined all individuals aged 6 and more years that had at least three teeth preserved in the skeletal sample from Staboszewo (Bydgoszcz voivodeship, Poland), dated to the 14th-17th century A.D. We examined 632 teeth belonging to 77 individuals of both sexes aged 6-70 years. Because the permanent dentition cannot be observed in young children, our conclusions and data base were obviously limited. Mesio-distal dimensions of the teeth were taken as indicators of their overall size. Naturally, we excluded from analysis teeth whose size was apparently affected by wear or pathological processes. In order to generalize the information on tooth size of individuals, the absolute dimensions of each premolar and molar were standardized on the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of appropriate tooth dimensions in the sample as a whole, and the average of standardized sizes of all teeth of a given individual was taken as a generalized measure of his/her posterior-dentition size (standardized tooth size). The arithmetic mean of the distribution of such a measure in a sample is theoretically predictable: if distributions of crude dimensions are normal, it should be insignificantly different from zero.
Parameters of the distributions of standardized tooth size in age-at-death groups in the sample examined are presented
